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The rise in world trade since 1970 has raised international mobility of labor services. We study the
effect of such a globalization of the world's labor markets. We find that when people can choose between
wage work and managerial work, the output gains are U-shaped: A worldwide labor market raises
output by more in the rich and the poor countries, and by less in the middle-income countries. This
is because the middle-income countries experience the smallest change in the factor-price ratio, and
where the option to choose between wage work and managerial work has the least value in the integrated
economy. Our theory also establishes that after economic integration, the high skill countries see a
disproportionate increase in managerial occupations. Using aggregate data on GDP, openness and
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We study how the integration of the world’s labor markets aﬀects development. Increasingly in recent
decades, economic agents who are very distant from each other can nonetheless potentially produce
together. The labor inputs themselves do not necessarily need to move in order for the output to be
consumed, as long as there is an adequate communication or transportation technology. In the light of
this transformation of the labor market, we ask which local economies will record the biggest gains in
output when the world labor market opens up. We show that the pattern of growth is U-shaped with
major gains for economies with either high or low GDP. We also investigate how economic integration
aﬀects occupational choice and show that the increase in managerial occupations is disproportionately
high in high-skill economies, and provide evidence in support of this pattern of occupational shift.
The basic premise of our analysis is a span-of-control production technology where the exact allo-
cation of skills between managers and workers determines the ﬁrm’s productivity. Identically skilled
agents in the labor market make an occupational choice decision whether to become manager or a
worker. Their choice is determined by equilibrium prices in the labor market. A manager’s produc-
tivity is determined by her skill and limited by her span-of-control. High skill managers are more
productive if they command a given set of workers than low skill managers. Because managers are not
perfect substitutes in this span-of-control technology while workers are, the exact allocation matters
both within the ﬁrm and economy-wide. The implication is that the compensation schedule for man-
agers is non-linear in manager skill and linear in worker skill. This compensation structure leads to
sorting of the higher skilled agents into managerial occupations.
Our model technology captures the production process of products like the Apple iPod or iPhone.
Design and software development are executed by high skill managers in Cupertino, California, while
most of the manufacturing happens in Taiwan and mainland China, and the ﬁnal product is sold
worldwide. The same is true for Italian designer clothing, the patterns of which are drawn and designed
in Milan and the raw materials and couture are produced in China. The main characteristic of these
production processes is the role of the managerial worker in aﬀecting the ﬁnal result. A small change
in her skill will substantially aﬀect the ﬁnal output, given the mass production at low wages. The skill
of the manager determines her span-of-control. Economic integration only exacerbates the impact of
the manager’s span-of-control because worker and manager need not be physically near to produce. In
that sense, the production with “distant” labor inputs turns up in the statistics of intermediate goods
being traded: Software and blueprints ﬂow from California to Taiwan; hardware ﬂows in the opposite
direction.
As a ﬁrst approximation we interpret autarky as a situation in which agents in each country have
identical skills but in which they can trade freely with agents in the same country. A conversion from
autarky to a world labor market leads to a U-shaped pattern with beneﬁts being highest for the high
GDP economies as well as for the low GDP economies. The high GDP countries now have access
2to a pool of cheap labor which gives their high skill managers a huge comparative advantage. This
drives up the world wage for workers, increasing the gains for the low GDP countries. For the middle
economies the gains are lowest, since there always exists a country, somewhere in the middle of the
distribution, where the wage remains unchanged, and where the residents are no better oﬀ than they
were under autarky. The middle-income countries experience the smallest change in the factor-price
ratio; for them the option to choose between wage work and managerial work has the least added value
in the integrated economy. We refer to this result as the middle-class theorem.
We account for how much of the gains in output are actually due to eﬃcient occupational switching.
Free trade raises output even in the absence of switching, simply because in a world market, workers
face diﬀerent prices for labor, and a manager in the US can now hire workers in, say, India at lower
wages. Occupational switching allows for additional eﬃciency gains because it may beneﬁtm o r eU S
agents to choose a career in managerial occupations rather than as wage workers. To account for the
additional occupational reallocation eﬀect, we shall decompose the eﬀect of openness into (i) The eﬀect
in which each agent’s occupation is held constant, and (ii) The occupational switching eﬀect, which our
model has. Eﬀect (i) raises the equilibrium span of control of high-ability managers and lowers it for the
low-ability managers, and implies a reallocation of existing workers among existing managers. Eﬀect
(ii) allows low-ability managers to become workers and high-ability workers to become managers, and
this leads to additional output gains. We show that the eﬃciency gains from occupational switching
are large.
In the general context of economic integration of any non-representative agent economy, we show that
the equilibrium allocation of any subeconomy coincides with the planner’s solution for the subeconomy.
We also ﬁnd that the economy that maximizes world output is the one that is fully integrated. Moving
from any subeconomy to a fully integrated economy, however, may make some agents worse oﬀ.I n
general, full integration does not Pareto dominate partial integration. This is because the gains from
integration are U-shaped, and the middle skill type who does not gain output relative to complete
autarky under full integration is typically not the same type under partial integration.
Because higher-skilled managers generate higher output with the same set of workers, a high-skill
economy has a comparative advantage in managerial occupations. With increased openness and eco-
nomic integration, this leads to a disproportionately high occupational choice of managerial jobs in
high-skilled economies. High skill managers can now access cheap labor world wide, which leads a large
portion of the agents to switch from wage labor before to management after economic integration.
Our theory of occupational choice, and the prediction that high skill economies disproportionately
switch into managerial occupations is borne out by occupational choice data. Using ILO standardized
occupation categories for 115 countries between 1970 and 2004, we ﬁnd that there is indeed a dispro-
portionate increase in the fraction of managerial jobs added in the economy. While all economies on
average have added managerial jobs since 1970, the high skill economies, those with a high GDP per
capita, have added substantially more. This tilting of the relation between occupational choice and
3skills provides evidence of a pattern of occupational choice that is consistent with our theory.
Finally our model is consistent with the ﬁnding by Gabaix and Landier (2006) that the recent rise in
the level and dispersion of managerial earnings is explained by a similar rise in the level and dispersion
of the resources under their control. Such a rise occurs in our model as a result of globalization, but
it does not take place in the standard model. Although it is formally about occupational choice, our
model is in the same general spirit as that of Yi (2003), who argues that at some point the post-1960
tariﬀ reductions suddenly led to a rise in the tendency for countries to specialize in the production of
particular stages of a good’s production sequence, and the consequent rise in the international trading
of intermediate goods.
Work closest to ours is Kremer and Maskin (2003, ‘KM’) and Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006, ‘AGR’) who deal, as we do, with the globalization of labor markets.1 To this work we add in
two ways. First, we prove our middle-class result which neither KM nor AGR contains, and that for
good reason: KM and AGR are both two-country models with heterogeneous populations, whereas
the middle-class result emerges only in a many-country world in which, prior to globalization, each
country is suﬃciently homogeneous when compared to the dispersion of skills in the world as a whole.
We do not know if such conditions have ever existed, but we do provide some evidence that the shift
towards autarky early on in the 20th century and the shift towards globalization late in the century
have both had eﬀects that can be better understood with the help of the middle-class theorem. Second,
we show new evidence that the integration of labor markets has been accompanied by a rise in the
fraction of agents choosing to be managers, more so in the rich than in the poor countries. This
conﬁrms our model’s implication that with globalization the rich countries should have experienced the
largest rise in managerial employment, but this is an implication that one ﬁnds also in AGR and, under
some conditions, in KM and in several other span-of-control models, and so we oﬀer this evidence as
supporting span-of-control models generally.
Lucas (1978) has a similar model, but in it workers all have the same wage, and so the distribution of
earnings has a counterfactual spike at the lowest income that most of the economy’s agents earn. Similar
spikes also exist in the models of Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2007) and Monge-Naranjo (2007). The
former paper studies the ﬂow of capital and management across countries and distinguishes country-
speciﬁca n dﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects on productivity.
2 The Model
We shall consider a world population consisting of agents endowed with a one-dimensional skill x.2
Production.–Firms produce output q with the input of a manager and a set of workers. Denote the
1Gavilan (2006) adds physical capital to KM model and studies its impact on the equilibrium assignment of workers
to managers.
2Two skills are considered in Section 7.1 and the results are similar.
4production function by
q = xQ(h) (1)
where x is the manager’s skill or eﬃciency and h is the total number of eﬃciency units of labor that the
ﬁrm’s workers possess. We assume Q0 > 0,a n dQ00 < 0. The manager is the entrepreneur who owns the
ﬁrm, and she hires workers at the price of w per their eﬃciency unit. The inputs into the production
function (1) enter asymmetrically: Only one manager can perform the job, but there is substitution of
quality and quantity of workers in h, and any number of workers can be hired.
The ﬁrm’s decision problem.–When facing an eﬃciency-units wage w,am a n a g e ro ft y p ex solves
the problem
π (x,w) ≡ max
h
{xQ(h) − wh}, (2)
which has the FOC
xQ0 (h)=w. (3)




occupational choice, i.e., the set of managers E(w) satisﬁes
E (w)={x ∈ R+ | π(x,w) >w x } (4)
and market clearing.
3 The Middle-Class Result
In this section, we consider the transition from a collection of representative agent economies in autarky
to a world economy with free trade.
Autarky. Under autarky, each atomless agent belongs to a local economy or country. Within that
country, agents are identical, each being of type, say, x, and each can become a worker or a manager.
As a worker that person would earn wx and as a manager, he or she would earn π (x,w).
Autarky Equilibrium is a wage w and a fraction n of people that become workers, such that they
solve the pair of equations (5) and (6). In equilibrium the supply of h would be xn and per manager
(the fraction of which is 1 − n) the supply of h would be xn/(1 − n). For managers to wish to employ







For managers and workers to all be happy in the occupation they have chosen, π (x,w) would have to










5We denote the Autarky Equilibrium by {w(x),n(x)}. It is the pair of numbers (w,n) solving (5) and
(6) for the type-x autarkic economy.
These equilibrium outcomes are driven by the feasible matches. In the case of autarky, only agents
of the same type can work together, implying labor income w(x)x and proﬁts π(x) are the same. The
implication is of course that wages are diﬀerent in each local economy indexed by x.
Example.–Let Q(h)=hα. Then (5) reads αxhα−1 = w, and (6) reads xhα − wh = wx. Together,
these two imply that h = α
1−αx. Since h = xn/(1 − n), this means that
n(x)=α and w(x)=( 1− α)1−αααxα. (7)
Worldwide labor market.L e tF (x) be the world distribution of x ∈ R+, assumed atomless. Now
w i saw a g et h a tp r e v a i l sw o r l dw i d e .At y p e - x manager in this economy still solves (2). Denote the
manager’s demand function h = g(x,w); it solves (3) for h.
Then the set of managers is the set E (w)={x ∈ R+ | π(x,w) >w x }. The market-clearing condi-






Then a World-market Equilibrium is a wage w that solves (8).3
Denote by z the skill type that is indiﬀerent between becoming a manager and a worker:
π(z,w)=wz. (9)
By the envelope theorem, πx = Q(g [x,w]), and since gx > 0, πxx > 0.S i n c eπ(0,w)=0 ,( 9 )h a sa t
most two intersections. Since F is atomless, it follows that E (w)=[ z,∞), i.e., employers are drawn
from the top of the distribution.
Under world-wide free mobility of labor, a high-skilled agent can start a ﬁrm and hire workers on
the world labor market at the world wage w (per eﬃciency unit). Because ﬁrms need both workers and
managers, not all types can become managers. The managers are in the high skill economies and hire
workers from low skill economies.
Example.–Again, let Q(h)=hα. As under autarky, the FOC is w = αxhα−1.U s i n g t h i s t o
substitute for w in (9), we get that for entrepreneur z, factor demand is g(z,w)= α
1−αz and therefore,
w =( 1− α)1−αααzα,







3This analysis will later be applied to a closed economy in which Fi is the distribution of skill in country i and in which
the world distribution of skills is ΣiFi.








Figure 1: Income proﬁle y(x) under autarky






Now suppose that α =1 /2 and that the skill distribution is uniform: F(x)=x.T h e nw eh a v ef o r
the autarky solution that for all x,p r o ﬁts and wage earnings are w(x)x = 1
2x
3
2. For the free-market








Earnings under autarky in function of skills x are plotted in Figure 1. In Figure panel 2, the straight
line (red) is the wage income, the constant wage times the eﬃciency units x. The convex function (blue)
is the proﬁt schedule. Low types are better oﬀ in the occupation of a worker, whereas high types earn
proﬁts that are over and above the wage income. The type z is the one who is indiﬀerent. In the case of








Figure 2: Income proﬁle under factor mobility (wage earnings (red) - proﬁts (blue))
full factor mobility, a high skilled agents start ﬁrms and their demand for labor drives up world wages.
Because the lower types have a competitive advantage as workers, they prefer to be hired rather than
be a manager.








Figure 3: Income proﬁles y(x) of all regimes








Figure 4: CDF and ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance under factor mobility.
The main result below establishes that the marginal type does not gain from factor mobility relative
to autarky. This is illustrated for the former example where we now plot the equilibrium and proﬁt
schedules on the same graph (Figure 3: autarky (in green) intersects exactly where wage earnings (red)
and proﬁts (blue) intersect. The graph plots income y(x)=π(x)=wx. That this dominance is weak
follows because z is equally well oﬀ under autarky and factor mobility.4 The plot for the C.D.F. under
both Autarky (green) and Factor Mobility (red and blue) is in Figure 4. We will now show that in
general, all agent types but one are strictly better oﬀ in a free market than under autarky. The one
4That country z is no better or worse oﬀ under free trade is a result that has a counterpart in the standard two-skill
model with a continuum of countries but with no occupational choice. Let factor endowments diﬀer. There always would
be one country in which the skill premium under autarky is the same as the world skill premium under free trade. That
country would then be no better oﬀ under free trade than under autarky.
8type that remains no better oﬀ than before is type z — the type that under the free market is indiﬀerent
between management and wage work. To avoid confusion, we shall use the superscript “A”f o rt h e
value that a variable assumes under autarky, and the superscript “F” for its free-market value.
Proposition 1 If (i) F(·) is atomless and continuous, and if (ii) Q0 (h) decreases continuously from
+∞ when h =0to 0 when h = ∞, an equilibrium with Factor Mobility exists at z, satisfying






= wA (z)z = wFz = πF (z). (12)
The proof starts from the premise that at z, the equilibrium allocation must satisfy the equilibrium
conditions for the equilibrium with factor mobility. The proof then shows that the exact same allocation














Now in autarky in country x = zF, the indiﬀerence condition is also met. I.e., (12) holds. This leaves
















1−n is human capital per manager. But by (ii), as the number of workers, n, rises from zero to
unity, Q0 declines from +∞ to zero, and so a unique n ∈ (0,1) exists for which this equation will hold,
with 1−n being the number of managers, so that the number of bodies adds up to unity. Finally, total
human capital supplied, nzF, equals the amount of it demanded,










Lemma 3 zF satisﬁes (11).








Figure 5: Earnings from factor mobility: diﬀerences
Proof. Suppose zF = xmax.T h e n b y (i) since there is no mass point at xmax, demand for h would
be zero, and there would be an excess supply of workers. Conversely, if zF = xmin there would be an
excess supply of workers.
Together, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply (12) and the Proposition.
Because under factor mobility, occupational choice eﬀectively implies that the equilibrium allocation
is the upper envelope of the wage and proﬁt schedule, the next Proposition immediately follows:
Proposition 4 (First order stochastic dominance) The distribution of earnings under Factor Mobility
(weakly) stochastically dominates the distribution under Autarky.
The question remains how important the role is of the occupational switching. Opening up trade in
itself will generate welfare gains even without occupational switching. In the next section, we therefore
perform the experiment in which we allow for mobility of labor, but we don’t allow agents to switch
occupations.
The Implications for Growth. By Proposition 2, there are gains from factor mobility. However,
from Proposition 1 those gains are not distributed equally over all types. At least one type is no better
oﬀ. In the next ﬁgure, we plot the gains from factor mobility by rank of the distribution5. Figure 5 has
the absolute diﬀerences and Figure 6 has the growth rates.
5Because there is no rank-reversal in our model, we could as well use ability x and in our uniform distribution example
the scale does not even change, x = F(x).








Figure 6: Earnings from factor mobility: ratio.
Figure 5 shows that in absolute terms, the biggest winners are in the right tail: The high types who
own the ﬁrms and become managers gain most from factor mobility. The type who is indiﬀerent does
not gain, and... workers gain throughout, except for the lowest type. This is because there is no lower
bound on ability bounded away from zero. In our example with the uniform distribution, the lower
type does not gain anything from factor mobility because output is zero before and after.
Figure 6 shows that relative to their initial position, the biggest winners are in the left tail. Growth
rates exhibit a U shape. The extremes of the distribution gain most from factor mobility. To see this,
consider the lowest types, who under autarky work with low productivity managers and earn very low
wages. After opening up to factor mobility, their labor is demanded from all over the world and their
wage is determined in the world labor market. This results in a huge increase in earnings.
The high types do grow and the growth rate is increasing in type, i.e. the top of distribution gains
proportionally more the higher up in the distribution. At the bottom of the distribution (below the
no-gaining middle income group) in growth rates now there is monotonicity. While worker salaries went
up everywhere in the lower part, they went up proportionally more for the lower types. Their output
therefore grows more the lower the type. That nonetheless does not translate into any income diﬀerences
as the lowest types still produce zero output; hence the non-monotonicity in income diﬀerences.
Globalization with no occupational switching. If a single global labor market opens, there is
a single wage ˜ w that would clear the market. Because occupational switching is not allowed, n(x)
type-x agents are still workers and 1 − n(x) are still managers in the new regime. Manager x solves
the decision problem in (2), and has a factor demand g (x,w),j u s ta sb e f o r e .T h em a r k e tc l e a r i n gw a g e















Figure 7: Gains from Trade with (blue)/without (red) sorting: levels
where n(x) is given by the equilibrium allocation under autarky. Notice that the RHS does not depend
on the wage — workers have no choice but to remain workers no matter what they are paid. There is a
gain in output over autarky, but it is limited by the inability of agents to switch occupations.
The Cobb-Douglas example again.–From (7) we know that n(x)=α,a n df r o mt h eF O Cw h i c h





































We plot the level of output (Figure 7) and the growth (Figure 8) that is due to openness while
keeping the allocation constant. For the uniform distribution with α = 1
2, we have that n(x)=1
2
and we get w = 1 √
6 =0 .40825, and π(x)=0 .61237x2. When there we constrain agents not to switch
occupations, identically skilled agents will have diﬀerent earning depending on their occupation. We
calculate the average per capita income in each country x, which is the weighted sum of wx and π(x)




Keeping the occupational allocation ﬁxed, opening up the world labor market implies that the ini-
tially identical people now face diﬀerent terms depending on their occupation. For the high x countries,








Figure 8: Gains from Trade with (blue)/without (red) sorting: levels
because now there is a world wage that is lower than the high x wage under autarky, the entrepreneurs
now earn more than the workers, even though they have the same type. In the low x countries, the
opposite is true: the workers do relatively better than the entrepreneurs. Next, we plot the ratio of
the highest earner by country in the economy where the allocational choice is frozen. All countries
now have some degree of inequality, and it is largest at the extremes. There is one country (typically
diﬀerent from z) without any inequality at all.6
4 Integrated Economies and Eﬃciency
Considering the case of representative agent economies under autarky is instructive for two reasons.
First, it provides a transparent insight into the fact that in any economy, there is an agent type who is
only as well oﬀ as under autarky of the representative agent economy. Second, the proﬁle of earnings of
the representative agent economies represents the lower bound on the world economy’s earnings proﬁle.
To see this, consider a world economy that consists of a group of countries in the West and a group in the
East. With full trade ﬂows within the West, the earnings proﬁle of the West economy will be U-shaped
6The occupation-switch eﬀect that we have emphasized becomes sizeable only when the regime shift oﬀe r san o n -
negligible change in earnings opportunities, such as globailization probably aﬀords. The analog in a single agent problem














∗ (θ) is the decision optimally taken when the environment is θ. The equality holds only for inﬁnitessimal changes

















13relative to the full autarky economy in the West, and likewise in East. This follows immediately from
Proposition 1, as applied to the East and West subeconomy. As a consequence, there will be a skill type
z in each subeconomy that is indiﬀerent between full autarky and free trade within the subeconomy.
In this section, we analyze the properties of integrating those initially isolated free trade zones in West
and East. First, we analyze the planner’s problem, then the properties of an integrated economy and
ﬁnally the Pareto ranking of integrated economies.
Consider any economy with skill distribution F(x), and with free trade within that economy (or
subeconomy). Then the planner’s problem is to choose an allocation to maximize output Y subject
to market market clearing. An allocation here is the allocational choice of all agents between worker
and manager, and the eﬃciency units h(x) employed in each ﬁrm. Because of the concavity of Q(·),
the allocational choice consists of a cut-oﬀ type z with all x ≥ z becoming managers, the remainder














where λ is the constant from the Lagrangian. The next result establishes the eﬃciency of the decen-
tralized equilibrium. Denote the economy’s per capita output by Y (F).
Proposition 5 The decentralized equilibrium outcome implements the planner’s solution.
Proof. From the ﬁrst order conditions on the planner’s problem, we get:
h : xQ0(h)=λ
z : zQ(h) − λh = λz
and inspection reveals that for λ = w, this solution coincides with the decentralized equilibrium solution.
Now consider two economies F1(x),F 2(x) with world population shares α1,α 2. Without loss of
generality, let F1(x) be the low skill economy. The integrated economy has a skill distribution F(x)=
α1F1 + α2F2. The next result establishes that output is larger in the integrated economy.
Proposition 6 Economies F1 and F2 induce diﬀerent wages w1 6= w2 if and only if the integrated
economy generates higher per capita output: Y (F) >α 1Y (F1)+α2Y (F2)
Proof. The set of managers, E (w), depends on w alone. (i) ‘If’: If Y (F) >α 1Y (F1)+α2Y (F2),e i t h e r
E (w1) or E (w2) must diﬀer from E (w). But then E (w1) 6= E (w2), or there would be more than one
14Figure 9: Illustration of Proposition 7.
market-clearing w for economy F, which cannot be because w is unique. (ii) ‘ O n l yi f ’ :I nl i g h to ft h e
previous proposition, it is feasible for the planner to use g(w1,x) and g(w2,x) to allocate workers to
managers in economy F. By concavity of Q(·), however, a convex combination of g1,g 2 would world
output Y (F).
The proposition implies that if two economies F1,F 2 induce identical wages w1 = w2, then they
must generate the same aggregate output Y (F)=α1Y (F1)+α2Y (F2) and vice versa.
Although aggregate output cannot be lower in the integrated economy, some agents may be worse
oﬀ.
Proposition 7 Suppose the world income distribution F(x) is atomless on the interval [xmin,x max].
Then there is a partially-free trade allocation that is not weakly Pareto dominated by free trade.
Proof. Since zF is on the interior of the support of F, consider two free-trade subeconomies,
£
xmin,zF¤








. Atomlessness of F and market clearing imply that the indiﬀerent agent
in zone 1, call him z1,s a t i s ﬁes z1 <z F. Now refer to income of agent x in zone 1 by y1 (x).B u t
then the reasoning leading up to (12) implies that y1 (z1)=wA (z1)z1, and y1 (x)=wA (x)x for all




zF = wFzF, the second equality following from (12).
This is illustrated in Figure 9. But then it follows that there is an entire interval (x∗,zF)i nw h i c h
agents in zone 1 are strictly better oﬀ than they would be under free trade. QED.
155 Occupational Choice and Openness
As a consequence of increased openness and trade of labor inputs, skilled agents switch occupations.
More skilled economies see a disproportionately large switch into managerial jobs. In the case of extreme
autarky, i.e. where each economy consists of identical agents, all economies initially have a fraction
1 − n(x) of managers. After the transition to free trade, the agents in those economies with skill level
x>zfully specialize in managerial jobs. As a result, there is an increase in the fraction of managers
from 1 − n to 1. The opposite is true for those economies with skill levels x<z ,where there is a
decrease in the fraction of managers from 1 − n to 0. This logic hinges heavily on the setup of an
extreme notion of autarky with representative agent economies.7 In this section, we show that this
pattern of occupational choice is general.
As before, consider two economies F1(x),F 2(x) with world population shares α1,α 2, and with F1(x)
the low skill economy, i.e. its distribution stochastically dominates country 2:F1(x) >F 2(x).W ed o n ’ t
need to make any assumptions on the distributions directly, it is suﬃcient that each of the economies
induce equilibrium wages such that w1 <w 2. The integrated economy has a skill distribution F(x) and
wages w.
Proposition 8 The fraction of managerial jobs increases in the high skill economy, and decreases in
the low skill economy.
Proof. Suppose w1 <w 2. Then we must have w1 <w<w 2,o t h e r w i s eh would be in excess supply or
excess demand. It follows that z1 <z<z 2.
This is illustrated graphically in Figure 10, in which the fraction of managers is denoted by pi(F)
so that, e.g., p1(F1) denotes the fraction of managers in country 1 before integration and p1(F) is the
fraction of managers after integration. A related result for their microfounded model of the knowledge
economy is derived in Antràs, Garicano and Rossi (2006 Proposition 1(i)). What happens to the
fraction of managers at the world level is indeterminate and depends on the characteristics of the initial
distributions: the world wide fraction of managers after opening up can both increase or decrease. That
is, either inequality α1F1(z1)+α2F2(z2) ≷ α1F1(zW)+α2F2(zW) could obtain.
The result that globalization leads to occupational switching hinges on the span-of-control technol-
ogy drives occupational choice. In a standard model with one ﬁnal good and two skills, globalization
would not lead to any occupational switching. Remove the span of control and, instead, let manage-
rial skill be perfectly substitutable in the production function which we may write as q = G(X,H).
7Below, in section 7.1, we introduce a more realistic environment with multi-dimensional skills. We show that the
fraction of managers increases more in high skill economies, but the increases is gradually without the discrete change to
100% managers. After free trade, the fraction of managers is smoothly increasing in the economy’s average skill.
16Figure 10: Occupational sorting after openness.
We now have X =
R
E xdF(x) and, as before, the supply of worker skills is H =
R
R+−E xdF(x). If G
has constant returns and if there is perfect competition, the skill prices would be w = ∂G/∂H, and
s ≡ ∂G/∂X. Occupational choice for a worker of type x would now involve involves choosing a time
allocation n(x) ∈ {0,1} to maximize wnx + s(1 − n)x. In equilibrium therefore, if w>s ,everyone
would choose to be a worker, and if w<severyone would choose to be a manager. Therefore w = s.
This would be true regardless of an economy’s skill endowment. Therefore the fraction of managers
would be the same in the two economies, and that fraction would remain the same if the two economies
were to merge. This is completely in line with the Ricardian model of trade. Since both countries can
access the same CRS production technology, no country has a comparative advantage in management
and there are no gains from trade.
6E v i d e n c e
The rise in world trade since 1970.–To ﬁnd whether the predictions of the model are consistent with
the facts, we need to document the increase in openness that in our theory is the causal factor of
occupational choice. Figure 11 shows U.S. total trade as a percentage of GDP. The Penn World Tables
(Summers-Heston) also include a measure of openness, again deﬁned as exports plus imports (i.e., total
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Figure 11: Openness US 1870-2004 (Imports + Exports/GDP).
population-weighted average of openness of all 58 countries in the sample that have observations for all
years between 1952 and 2003. Both sets of data conﬁr mt h er i s ei no p e n n e s si nt h e‘ 7 0 s ,w i t ht h ew o r l d



















Figure 12: Openness World Average (Imports + Exports/GDP) — Penn World Tables
6.1 Evidence on Occupational Switching
Both in the one-dimensional and in the multi-dimensional version of the model (see Sec. 7.1), the
theory predicts that openness will lead higher skill economies to have a larger increase in the fraction
of managerial jobs than the lower skill economies. We will verify whether that prediction is consistent
with evidence from occupation data. We use data from the ILO,8 reporting standardized occupation
categories. We have annual data between 1970 and 2004 with observations for 115 countries, augmented
8http://laborsta.ilo.org/
18with GDP/capita data from the Penn World Tables (Summers-Heston).9 We construct a variable p
with the proportion of managerial jobs. Managerial jobs include for example general and corporate
managers, science and business professionals, but not oﬃce clerks and salespersons.
Let p(y,t) be the fraction of managers in country y at date t, where y denotes GDP/capita measured
in 2004 dollars. Theory predicts a dependence of p(y,t) on income that increases with openness.
Openness has increased substantially since the 1970s, and the eﬀect of increased openness as predicted
by the theory should be captured in the following regression:
p(y,t)=a0 + a1 · lnyt + a2 · t · lnyt + a3 · t.
We are looking for a signiﬁcant positive estimate of the coeﬃcient a2 which indicates that over time,
the dependence on income increases. We set t0 = 1950 and t = {year} − 1950.
For the entire sample, we have N =1 3 6 1observations, keeping in mind there are many missing
observations, especially early on in the sample. The estimates for this speciﬁcation are:





· lnyt +0 .0012
(0.0002)
· t · lnyt − 0.0078
(0.0021)
· t
The estimate b a2 is positive and highly signiﬁcant, which conﬁrms the more-than-proportional increase
in the fraction of managerial jobs for high skill economies. From the outset, high income countries have
a higher fraction of managers (b a1 is positive). Due to increased openness, every year the high income
countries increase the fraction proportionately more by 0.12 percentage points per lny.O v e r35 years
between 1970 and 2004, the cumulative eﬀect is 4.2 percentage points. The next table translates the
estimated proportion of managers for diﬀerent levels of real income y in 2004 dollars between 1970 and
2004.
yp 1970 p2004 ∆p ∗
5,000 16.1% 24.3% 8.2%
10,000 17.3% 28.3% 11.1%
20,000 18.5% 32.4% 13.9%
30,000 19.2% 34.7% 15.5%
∗ ∆p = p
2004−p
1970
On average, there has been a steady increase in managerial jobs between 1970 and 2004 for all countries
in the sample. What this table highlights is that the increase has been far bigger for high GDP
countries: an increase in real GDP from 5,000 to 30,000 in 1970 implies an increase increase in the
fraction managerial jobs of 3.1 percentage points (from 16.1% to 19.2%). In 2004, the same increase in
real GDP from 5,000 to 30,000 induces an increase in managerial jobs of 10.4% (from 24.3% to 34.7%).
In other words, the slope of the estimated relation between p and lny has become 3.3 times steeper.
9http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/




















































Figure 13: Occupational choice by GDP.
This is also borne out in the data. Figure 13 plots the regression line as predicted by the model
for the years 1974 (left panel) and 2004 (right panel)10, as well as the data. In the Appendix we also
report these plots at ﬁve year intervals.
Finally, we also repeat the same exercise using openness instead of time. Openness can both increase
or decrease the proportion of managers. Countries that become more open but are low skilled will see
a lower impact relative to trend. The countries that are more open and highly skill will see a bigger
increase in managerial occupations. To capture this, we construct a variable Tt
¯ yt that measures total




¯ yt which measures trade as a percentage of GDP times GDP relative to average GDP.
We estimate the following model:
p(y,t)=a0 + a1 ·
Tt
¯ yt











This model conﬁrms the results from the theory. The coeﬃcient on the openness variable is positive
and signiﬁcant indicating that the fraction managers has gone up more in those countries that are both
more open and have a higher GDP relative to the country average. Again, there is also a trend and the
proportion of managers increases across the board.
10We use 1974 because it is the ﬁrst year in the sample with suﬃcient observations.
20Figure 14: U-shaped Growth 1970-2000 — kernel regression (left) and polynomical ﬁt( r i g h t ) .
6.2 Evidence on Growth
Our theory predicts a U-shaped pattern for growth in the presence of increased openness. Between
1970 and 2000, the middle countries did worse than countries in the tails of the distribution of GDP
per capita. Summers and Heston provide data for 148 countries on GDP per capita (ppp-adjusted
and at constant prices) and population. Figure 14 plots the scatter plot with the annualized growth
rates. Each country is represented by a dot and the size of the dot is proportional to that country’s
population. Together with the data, in the left panel we plot the kernel regression which approximates
t h et r u er e l a t i o n s h i pg(y) between growth (g) and GDP (y). The estimate of b g(y) is a local average
around the point y, which smooths the value of g around y. We smooth using a Gaussian kernel, a
continuous weight function symmetric around y, with bandwidth 0.5.
The Figure is consistent with the inverted U-shape of growth that the theory predicts. In addition
to the kernel, in panel B we plot a second degree polynomial ﬁtted to the data which further conﬁrms
the U-shaped pattern. Of course, growth is likely to have been aﬀected by factors other than just the
eﬀect of increased openness on occupational choice. Nonetheless, even if other factors have aﬀected
growth, it is not immediate that those would lead to a U-shaped pattern.
Robustness: Maddison Historical Data. — Further evidence consistent with the theory is that the
argument also works in reverse: As we move from free trade to autarky, growth rates will therefore
exhibit an inverted U shape, being highest for the middle-income countries. The period following World
War I arguably such a period. Figure 11 above suggests it, and so we shall assume that there also was a
considerable drop in eﬀective factor mobility between the pre-WWI era and the Great Depression. To
cover this period, we use as a source the Maddison (1995) historical data. More speciﬁcally, we make use
21Figure 15: Inverted U-shaped Growth 1910-1929 — kernel regression (left) and polynomical ﬁt( r i g h t ) .
of the series composed by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) based on Maddison (1995). To construct
the entire world income distribution, this series bundles economies in 33 diﬀerent groups of regions and
comparable economies. It has observations for 1910 and 1929, so we calculate annual growth rates for
this period.11 As above for the period 1970-2000, the following Figure 15 has the annualized growth
rates on the vertical and the log of GDP per capita on the horizontal, just like Figure 14. We have both
the data points together with a graph of the kernel regression (left panel) to smooth out the relation
(Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 0.5). The plot suggests that growth rates exhibit an inverted U shape
in GDP/cap. The middle economies grow faster than the small and large economies. This is consistent
with our theory since that period is an era of decreasing openness. This is further conﬁrmed if when
ﬁtting the data to a second degree polynomial (right panel).
6.3 The Wage Distribution
The world’s income distribution is bell-shaped and skewed to the right (Sala-i-Martin 2006), which favors
our model in contrast to the Lucas (1978) type of model in which the distribution wages is degenerate
because as workers, agents all have the same level of skill. As a result, all workers obtain the same
wages, which leads to a mass point in the earnings distribution. In contrast, the input in production in
our model is a worker’s eﬃciency units and as a result, the equilibrium worker compensation depends on
the worker’s skill x : y(x)=wx. The underlying skill distribution will therefore determine the worker
11We exclude data for the 1930s as people argue that the Great Depression is caused by many other factors. The next
observation in this data set is 1950, which according to the openness data is already too far after the decrease in openness
we aim to capture.
22Figure 16: Predicted income distribution: Lucas (1978) (left) and our model (right).
earnings distribution. For example, if σ2 is the variance of the skill distribution, then the variance
of the worker income distribution is w2σ2(x | x<z ). In Lucas, the variance of the worker earnings
distribution is zero, irrespective of the underlying skill distribution. This is illustrated in Figure 16.
Because in 2004 on average 75% of employment is non-managerial, our model better captures the bulk
of the earnings distribution.
7R o b u s t n e s s
In this section we study the robustness of our setup. First, we introduce multi-dimensional skills and
derive occupational choice in equilibrium. Second, we make explicit the intermediate-goods interpreta-
tion that we want to give and that is behind the mobility in this labor market. Third, we assume that
zero-proﬁt ﬁrms compete to hire both workers and managers. In each of these variations, our results
are essentially unaltered.
7.1 Two skills
Endow agents with a pair (x,y),w h e r ex represents the skill level as a manager and y is the skill level
as a worker, distributed according to F(x,y).12 Firms still produce output q according to (1) and solve
(2), except that h is the total amount of skill y that manager x employs.
Global market.–Now w is the world-wide wage per unit of y and h = g(x,w) is factor demand by
12This section builds on Jovanovic (1994), a two-skill span of control model.
23Figure 17: Two-skill equilibrium
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Now the managerial-skill type zF (y) is indiﬀerent between becoming a manager and a worker. That
is, zF (y) solves for z the equation
π(z,w)=wy. (15)







From the envelope theorem, ∂π
∂x = Q(h) and therefore z00 (y) < 0 because h is strictly increasing in x.
Therefore its inverse is convex as shown in panel 1 of Figure 17.
Autarky.–We assume that while y diﬀers over countries, each country is homogeneous with respect
to y. That is, in country y agents are identical as workers, but diﬀerent as managers, precisely as Lucas
(1978) assumed. Thus (1) in country y reads q = xQ(yn) where n is the number of workers hired, and
(2) becomes
π (x,w) ≡ max
n
{xQ(yn) − w(y)ny},
where wA (y) is the autarky wage per unit of y in country y. This problem gives rise to the demand






24Then country y’s market clearing condition which wA (y) must solve for w is
Z
zA(y)
nd (x,y,w)dF (x | y)=F
¡
zA (y) | y
¢
, (16)
the RHS being the fraction of country y’s population that elects wage working as its occupation.
Lemma 9 There exists a unique y∗ in the interior of the support of H for which wA (y)=wF.
Proof. Since wA (y) is strictly increasing there can be at most one such y∗.S i n c ewA is also continuous,
if such a y∗ did not exist, the solution wF to (14) would have to exceed wA (ymax) or be less than
wA (ymin), the latter two solving (16). But in the free-trade economy that would entail an excess supply
of h or an excess demand for h, respectively.
Proposition 10 (Middle Class) Each agent in country y∗ is indiﬀerent between autarky and free
trade.
Welfare eﬀects of globalization.–In contrast to the one-skill case, now there are agents that are
made worse oﬀ from the globalization of labor markets. Broadly speaking, worse oﬀ are the workers
in rich countries and entrepreneurs in the poor countries. In poor countries, those with y<y ∗, the
remaining entrepreneurs are worse oﬀ because there wF >w A (y): the entrepreneurs must pay higher
w a g e st oh i r et h es a m ew o r k e r s .A n di nr i c hc o u n t r i e s ,t h o s ew i t hy>y ∗, the remaining workers are
worse oﬀ because there wF <w A (y). To better describe these outcomes we now assume:
(A) The ratio x/y is identically distributed over countries so that
x = yε,
where ε ∼ G(ε),a n dG does not depend on y.
This leads to the following characterization of autarky equilibrium:























25Proof. For manager yε,t h eF O Cw . r . t .n reads y2εQ0 (yn)=wy, i.e.,
yεQ0 (yn)=w, (21)
The marginal manager yε∗ satisﬁes yε∗Q(yn∗) − wyn∗ = wy, i.e.,
ε∗Q(yn∗)=w(1 + n∗) (22)
where n∗ is ε∗’s employment. Evaluate (21) at ε∗ and combine it with (22) to get
Q(yn∗)=yQ0 (yn∗)(1+n∗). (23)
If Q(h)=hα, (23) reads (yn∗)
α = yα(yn∗)
α−1 (1 + n∗), i.e., n∗ = α(1 + n∗),i.e., (17). To evaluate,




















Then (20) follows because (21) evaluated at ε∗ reads













These autarkic economies have the same distribution of employment, determined by the distribution
of ε along with α. They have the same fractions of managers and workers, as illustrated in Panel 2 of
Figure 17 where the contour of indiﬀerent types is linear. In contrast, under free trade the contour of
indiﬀerent types is convex, indicating that in the high skill countries there has been a higher increase in
the fraction of mangers. Therefore the test reported in section 6.1 and illustrated Figure 13 is consistent
with the two-skill model too: the fraction of managers should rise for y>y ∗,f a l lf o ry<y ∗,a n dr e m a i n
unchanged for y = y∗, as is evident from Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Welfare eﬀects of globalization
In each autarkic economy y, then, the distribution of income will be exactly as in the left panel of Figure
16, but scaled up by the country-speciﬁc constant y1+α. But both before and after globalization, the
world’s income distribution will look more like the distribution in the right panel. When ε is unbounded,
the two regimes compare as illustrated in Figure 18.13
The welfare eﬀects in Figure 18 follow from wA (y) being higher than wF above y∗ and lower than
wF below y∗. A rise in the wage is good for continuing workers and bad for continuing managers, and
a fall in the wage has the opposite eﬀect. The shaded areas involve switchers, and cannot be signed a
priori. Agents along the dashed green line are exactly as well oﬀ as they were before.




































































= x(1 − lnx).
13Let the support of G be unbounded and let ε be independent of y.L e ty ∼ H (y) be the marginal distribution of y.








27Figure 19: The bivariate uniform example
For the free-trade equilibrium, (3) reads xαhα−1 = w so that g (x,w)=
¡αx
w














x1/(1−α). Simplifying, and noting
that 1 − 1
1−α = − α








x1/(1−α).( 2 6 )
The set of entrepreneurs is (removing the ‘F’ superscript from w),
E (w)={(ε,y) | π (εy,w) >w y }



















Since y−α goes to inﬁnity as y goes to zero, ε∗ (y) may exceed unity and the set of entrepreneurs may
















and wF uniquely solves it. When α =1 /2, Figure 19 shows the situation under autarky and under free
trade. Since ε ≤ 1,w eh a v ex ≤ y, so that all agents are above the 450 line. Note the following:









2. Economies with y<0.26 have no managers under free trade, as was the case for the poor
economies in the one-skill case. Under autarky, roughly one third of the population are managers,
and so a large number of people switch switch from management to wage work.
3. The “middle” country whose agents are all indiﬀerent between autarky and free trade is y∗ =0 .65,
which we can verify by comparing the wages in the two regimes. While wF =0 .25, (18) gives
wA (y)=0 .31
√
y so that y∗ =0 .65.
7.2 An intermediate-goods interpretation
We interpret our model as one of trade in intermediate inputs, that allow managers and workers who
are distant to collaborate in the same production process. Because our model remains agnostic about
the exact speciﬁcation of these intermediate inputs, we show how the intermediate-goods interpretation
can be made explicit in our model.
By a change units, then, the model becomes one in which we can talk about the globalization of
intermediate-goods markets, in the spirit of Yi (2006). Let us call I an intermediate good and c the
only ﬁnal good and that the production function for c uses managerial skill x and the intermediate
good as follows:
c = x ˜ Q(I),
The intermediate good is produced with labor services, h,a l o n e :
I = Ah.
If these production possibilities are to be the same as under the previous interpretation, we must have





Wages, prices, and proﬁts.–Let pI be the price of the intermediate good in terms of the numeraire
consumption good. Competitive producers of I bid up the wage per unit of x to w = ApI, so that the
income of a type-x worker in the intermediate—goods industry is xApI.A saﬁnal-good producer, that
individual would earn a proﬁto f
π (x,pI)=m a x
I
n
x ˜ Q(I) − pII
o
. (27)
Autarky equilibrium.–In homogeneous society x, let nI be employment in the intermediate-goods
industry. Then total production of I is AxnI. Equilibrium is a price pI (x) and employment nI (x)






= pI and π(x,pI)=xApI. (28)




, we see that (5) and (6) imply that (28) holds if and only if




Free trade equilibrium. – N o ww el o o kf o rt h ew o r l dp r i c eo fI, pF
I , and the set of ﬁnal-goods producers
EI the set of producers of wine, i.e., the set of managers as before that prefer to manage than to be
workers in the cloth industry:
EI = {x | π(x,pI) >x A p I},







(the counterpart of (8)) where gI is the demand function for I that solves the problem (27). Then
arguing just as for the case of autarky, we ﬁnd that if we set








then equilibrium in the market for services as deﬁned after eq. (8) implies equilibrium in the market
for intermediate goods and vice versa.
7.3 A market for management
Even though returns are not constant, we can decentralize the equilibrium using markets for both labor
and management. We start with autarky which is much simpler.
Autarky.–Under autarky, it follows immediately that zero-proﬁt ﬁrms would replicate the free-
market equilibrium. A ﬁrm would hire N workers, and assign a fraction n of them to be managers, and













Proposition 12 Under autarky, the introduction of a managerial market and zero-proﬁt ﬁrms leaves
the equilibrium unchanged, and
p = w(x)x.







so N drops out of the problem. Moreover, since (6) can be written as Q − w n
1−n = w,i ti se q u i v a l e n t





























Substituting from (29) and multiplying by n,w eg e txQ0 (h)=w, i.e., (5).
Free trade.–In this decentralization, each person has a price, p(x) that depends on his or her
skill. Taking the prices as given, ﬁrms hire people and assign them to be either managers or workers.
Markets are complete in the sense that for each x there is a price. For each x, a representative ﬁrm
hires n(x)=f (x) people of type x and uses nm (x) of them as managers, and the rest as workers.14
It allocates h(x) eﬃciency units to managers of type x. It chooses these things to solve the following
problem







subject to the (single) constraint that the number of eﬃciency units employed in wage work not exceed




x[n(x) − nm (x)]dx.
and to the constraint (one for each x) that each type is divided between management and
0 ≤ nm (x) ≤ n(x).
Finally, free entry of ﬁrms requires that proﬁts be zero
V =0 .











14We use the more intuitive n(x)
31The FOCs are
h : xQ0 (hx) − λ =0
nm,x : xQ(hx) − λhx + λx − θ(x)+μ(x)=0








for x ≥ zF (30)
Proof. The proof will show that when (30) holds, occupational selection is the same, and allocation of
eﬃciency units to managers is the same. Substitute from (30) into the FOCs along with λ = wF and
show that they hold. Doing this the FOCs read
h : xQ0 (hx) − wF =0
nm,x : xQ(hx) − wFhx + wFx − θ(x)+μ(x)=0
nx : wFx + θ(x) −
(




for x ≥ zF =0 .
Using the third to solve for
θ(x)=
(




− wFx for x ≥ zF .
Thus, the constraint nm (x) ≤ n(x) is slack exactly for the same set of workers that choose the wage-
work option in equilibrium. Now substitute for θ(x) into the second FOC to get:
xQ(h[x]) − wFh(x)+
(




for x ≥ zF + μ(x)=0 .
Now from the deﬁnition of π
¡
x,wF¢
we have the following solution for μ(x):
μ(x)=
(
wF (h(x) − x) − xQ(h[x]) for x<z F
0 for x ≥ zF .
Thus, the constraint nm (x) ≥ 0 is slack exactly for the same set of workers that choose the self-
employment option in equilibrium.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have argued that the integration of labor markets reallocates existing workers among existing
managers, and that it prompts people to switch occupations so that the set of managers and workers
32changes. As in the standard model, a worldwide labor market raises output by more in the rich and the
poor countries than in the middle-income countries. But we have also found that occupational choice
adds substantially to the output and welfare gains to free trade in labor services. We also found, as
the model predicts, that the rich countries have experienced a much larger increase in the fraction of
people in management positions.
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